The (non) effect of natural resource dependence on capital accumulation in Latin America by Blanco, Luisa & Grier, Robin
Pepperdine University
Pepperdine Digital Commons
School of Public Policy Working Papers School of Public Policy
1-1-2011
The (non) effect of natural resource dependence on
capital accumulation in Latin America
Luisa Blanco
Pepperdine University, luisa.blancoraynal@pepperdine.edu
Robin Grier
University of Oklahoma Norman Campus
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in School of Public Policy Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blanco, Luisa and Grier, Robin, "The (non) effect of natural resource dependence on capital accumulation in Latin America" (2011).
Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy Working Papers. Paper 26.
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers/26
The (non) effect of natural resource dependence 
on capital accumulation in Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In a simultaneous model of human and physical capital accumulation for 17 Latin American 
countries from 1975 to 2004, we show that overall resource dependence is not significantly 
related to physical and human capital.  Disaggregating the natural resource variable into sub-
categories, we find that petroleum export dependence is associated with higher physical capital 
and lower human capital, while agricultural export dependence is often associated with lower 
levels of physical capital. All of these effects are quantitatively small, however, casting doubt on 
the idea that natural resource dependence has stifled the accumulation of capital in the region.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The resource curse, where an abundance of natural wealth ends up being a curse rather 
than a blessing to a country, is a well-known paradox in the development literature.  It is a 
paradox because resource abundance was once considered a key to economic growth and 
development.  The industrial revolution in England was thought to have been driven by the 
country’s large deposits of coal, while the rise of the US economy was at least partly based on its 
abundance of natural resources.  Modern day examples of the curse abound, however.  The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria are just a few developing 
countries that are rich in sub-soil wealth and poor in almost every other development indicator.   
In fact, if we were to construct a matrix of natural resources and wealth, we would find 
that no box would be empty of examples.  While there are plenty of resource-rich countries 
which grew quickly, there are also countries like Japan, which grew extremely quickly in the 
post-WWII period with few natural resources.  There are also countries like Somalia, which is 
resource poor and has had little economic growth. Thus, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
relationship between resources and development is far from clear-cut.   
While most of the research on the resource curse has focused on economic growth, there 
are an increasing number of papers that study the effect of resource dependence on factor 
accumulation.  Since capital is a determinant of economic growth, lower capital accumulation 
would also mean lower average growth rates.  In this paper, we investigate the effect of natural 
resource dependence on human and physical capital accumulation in a panel of 17 Latin 
American countries between 1975-2004, a region known for its resource abundance as well as its 
resource dependence.1  Even after more than 50 years of diversification away from primary 
                                                
1 The World Bank (2006) classifies Latin America and the Caribbean as having the second highest per-capita natural 
capital levels in the world, where natural capital is defined as the sum of all sub-soil assets, timber and non-timber 
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goods, 68% of Latin America’s total merchandise exports in 2000-2004 still consisted of natural 
resources.2  
Our work contributes to the literature on the natural resource curse in five ways.  First, 
we focus on resource dependence (or more specifically, export-dependence on resources) rather 
than resource abundance.3 Some resource-rich countries (like Australia or the United States) do 
not rely much on primary commodity exports, while other resource-rich countries (especially oil-
exporters) depend heavily on primary commodity exports.    
Second, we disaggregate the data on natural resources to determine if different resource 
types have different effects on capital accumulation.  Mining and petroleum extraction, for 
example, are often very capital-intensive processes, which means that countries that rely heavily 
on these activities may have higher than average levels of physical capital.  On the other hand, 
agricultural production tends to be not as capital intensive as other sectors, such as 
manufacturing. We find that while overall total primary commodity exports (as a percentage of 
GDP) are not significantly related to the accumulation of human and physical capital, petroleum 
exports are associated with higher levels of physical capital and lower levels of human capital.  
We also show that Latin American countries that export a large percentage of agricultural goods 
typically have lower levels of physical capital on average.4  Mining exports are never 
significantly related to either physical or human capital accumulation in our sample. 
                                                                                                                                                       
resources, pasture and crop land, and protected areas. The region has less natural per-capita natural capital than 
Europe and Central Asia ($11,031) but more than the Middle East and North Africa ($7,989). 
2 See Table 1 for a ranking of the countries in our sample by the percentage of primary products exported as a 
percentage of total merchandise exports.  Exports from Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela are the most resource-
intensive in Latin America, with primary products making up almost 90 percent of total exports.  
3 See Brunnschweiler (2008) and Gylfason (2008) for more on this topic. 
4 By the term primary commodities, we refer to those commodities that Leamer (1984) argues are particularly 
resource-intensive, such as petroleum, forest products, animal products, tropical agricultural products, and cereals. 
In Table 2 we discuss which commodities are considered resource intensive. 
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Third, while much of the literature has either focused on individual countries or large-N 
cross-sections or panels, we concentrate on a single region.  In any empirical estimation, we 
ideally would like a sample where (1) all the observations come from the same data generating 
process, and (2) there is sufficient variation in the explanatory variables that we are able to 
accurately estimate their effects. Limiting the sample to a single region, and one that has shared a 
common colonial background (or similar background in the case of Brazil) increases the 
possibility that the observations come from the same data generating process.5 While large 
samples increase the risk of inappropriately pooling data from heterogeneous countries, focusing 
on a small sample of countries brings its own risks; namely, that there is no interesting variation 
to investigate.  Fortunately, Latin America has enough variability in resource dependence to 
make the region an appropriate laboratory for our purposes.6  Besides overall variation in natural 
resources, there is also variation in the different types of resources.7   
Fourth, as noted above, we investigate the relationship between natural resources and 
physical and human capital accumulation and not on economic growth per se.  Growth 
regressions that include education, investment, and natural resources as right hand side variables 
imply that resources do not affect growth via human or physical capital accumulation.  In these 
specifications, resource intensity only raises growth through its effect on total factor 
productivity.  There is both theory and empirical evidence that resources affect human and 
                                                
5 Grier and Tullock (1989) show that countries from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Western Europe do not share 
a common set of coefficients in growth regressions. 
6 For instance, for the years 1975-2004, natural resource exports made up an average of 12% of GDP in the region.  
Venezuela, Ecuador, Honduras, and Chile, however, exported more than one standard deviation above this average 
during this time period. Venezuela’s natural resource exports were around 23% of GDP, Ecuador’s was 21%, and 
Honduras and Chile followed closely behind with resource exports accounting for approximately 19% of GDP. On 
the low end of the range were Mexico and Brazil, both of which had natural resource exports equal to around 5-6% 
of their national income. All of the numbers cited in this paragraph were calculated by the authors using data from 
UN COMTRADE and the WDI. 
7 For instance, while 84% of Venezuela’s exports consist of petroleum, most of the region does not export a lot of 
oil.  There are 6 countries in our sample where oil exports make up less than 1% of total exports (Nicaragua, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, Honduras, and Paraguay).  Similar variation can be found in the region in agricultural exports 
as well as non-petroleum mineral exports. Table 1 provides more information on this topic. 
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physical capital, however, which means that augmented Solow regressions that include resource 
dependence as an independent variable are unlikely to fully capture the effect of resources.   
Lastly, Grier (2002) shows that there are important spillover effects between human and 
physical capital accumulation in Latin America.  Investigating the effect of resource dependence 
on human or physical capital by itself will not reveal the true overall effect because we are not 
controlling for these spillovers. For that reason, we study resource dependence in a simultaneous 
model of physical and human capital. 
 Section II discusses the effect of resource abundance on physical and human capital, 
while Section III discusses our methodology and data.  Section VI discusses the results, and 
Section V concludes. 
 
II. NATURAL RESOURCES AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 Most of the empirical work on natural resources emphasizes the link between resources 
and economic growth.8  While it is important to study the relationship between resources and 
overall growth, we still need to identify the channels through which the resource curse works.  
That is, natural resource dependence can affect growth through its impact on factor accumulation 
or by its effect on productivity.  In this paper we focus on the former. 
                                                
8 There is extensive work on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth. While some argue 
that it is possible that resource wealth can stimulate economic growth (Lewis, 1989; Brunnschweiler, 2008), much 
of the literature emphasize the drawbacks to resource abundance (Auty, 2001; Corden, 1984; Gelb, 1988; Neary and 
van Wijnbergen, 1986; Prebisch, 1950; Sachs and Warner, 1999 and 2001; Tornell and Lane, 1999, Arezki and van 
der Ploeg, 2010; Coxhead, 2007; and Bulte and Damania, 2008). See Lederman and Maloney (2008) for a good 
literature review on the impact of resource abundance on growth and Wick and Bulte (2009) for an overview of the 
literature on the resource curse. 
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  Sachs and Warner (1997), Gylfason (2008), and Gylfason and Zoega (2006) identify 
several ways in which resources could negatively affect the accumulation of physical capital.9  
First, natural resource wealth may shorten the time horizons of policymakers. They may 
consume more today, and invest less carefully and productively, than policymakers without 
access to resource wealth.10  Second, resource dependence may also result in the Dutch disease, 
where the exports of a profitable primary commodity cause the real exchange rate to appreciate, 
thus making manufacturing sectors less remunerative.11  If the manufacturing sector is more 
capital intensive than the commodity sector, then the real exchange rate appreciation would lead 
to less overall capital in the economy.12   
Gylfason (2008, p. 17) also makes the argument that natural capital, in the form of 
resources, can “crowd out” financial and physical capital: “When a substantial part of national 
wealth is stored in a natural resource, there may be correspondingly less need for financial 
intermediation to conduct day- to-day transactions…[because]… consumption can be financed 
through more rapid depletion of the natural resource and saving can take place through less rapid 
                                                
9 On the other hand, the effect of resource dependence on physical capital may depend on what type of commodity is 
being considered.  Mining, for example, is often a very technological complex process requiring a large amount of 
investment in human and physical capital. See Wright and Czelusta (2004) for more on this topic. 
10 Sachs and Warner (1997, p. 10) argue that, “governments that controlled natural resource rents tended to waste the 
rents through profligate or inappropriate consumption.”     
11 Matsuyama (1994) constructed a formal model of the idea that manufacturing promotes economic development 
through learning by doing, while primary commodity sectors do not.  Frankel (2010, p. 14) notes that “the 
implication (of Matsuyama’s model) would be that deliberate policy-induced diversification out of primary products 
into manufacturing could help bring about economic development, and that a permanent commodity boom that 
crowds out manufacturing could indeed retard it.”  He goes on to note that “public monopoly ownership and 
prohibition on importing foreign expertise or capital has often stunted development of the mineral sector” in Latin 
America. Pegg (2010), on the other hand, uses the case of Botswana to show just how difficult it is for a resource-
abundant country to diversify away from the primary-commodity sector. Auty (2001b) also discusses the issue of the 
Dutch disease in Botswana, arguing that Botswana has been more successful in dealing with this problem than a 
country like Saudi Arabia. According to Auty (2001a), non-mineral exports are around one-third of total exports in 
Botswana, while in Saudi Arabia they are only one-fifth of total exports.  
12 Mikesell (1997) provides a good review of the different ways in which the resource curse can hamper economic 
development.  He argues that an export boom may move resources into the primary commodity sector and out of 
manufacturing.  Given that the tradeable sector is likely to be the more capital intensive of the two, the boom would 
thus be associated with less overall capital accumulation in the economy.  
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depletion (or of more rapid renewal if the resource is renewable).” The problem is magnified 
when most of the resource rents are deposited outside of the country, leaving the domestic 
banking sector under-capitalized.  Entrepreneurs outside of the profitable resource sector may 
have trouble securing credit, thus reducing the amount of investment available for manufacturing 
activities.13 
 Resource dependence may also affect human capital.  Gylfason (2001a) argues that 
primary commodity sectors tend to use less skilled labor (and possibly less high-quality capital) 
and have few linkages to other sectors of the economy.  Workers in the natural resource sector 
would have little to offer manufacturing firms looking for a highly skilled labor force, and a 
government that emphasizes primary commodities would have less need to push for educational 
investments.  Stijns (2006), on the other hand, argues that natural resource wealth (at least in the 
form of minerals) should be positively related to education levels.  He argues (2005, p. 1061) 
that, “it would be surprising that while mineral states tend to lavishly spend their revenues on 
numerous development projects and programs, education would be the only exception.”14    
Cabrales and Hauk (2011) argue that the relationship between human capital and natural 
resources might be different across countries.  They construct a theoretical model where the 
abundance of natural resources has a positive effect on education in countries with good 
institutions, and a negative effect in countries with bad ones.   
Empirically, the relationship between natural resources and capital accumulation is 
somewhat mixed. Sachs and Warner (1997), in a cross section of 90 countries from 1970-1990, 
find no statistically significant relationship between resource wealth and savings, education, and 
                                                
13 See Yuxiang and Zhongchang (2011) for an excellent articulation of the many ways in which resource abundance 
may crowd out financial development.  They investigate a sample of Chinese provinces between the years 1996 to 
2006 and find a negative and significant correlation between resources and financial development. 
14 Gylfason (2008) acknowledges this point, noting that Botswana, a country with enormous diamond wealth, spends 
more on education (relative to income) than any other nation in the world. 
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investment.  Papyrakisa and Gerlagh (2006), however, find in a cross-section of 82 countries in 
1994 that there is a strong, negative relationship between a country’s investment in physical 
capital and its endowment of natural capital.  Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that the 
countries most affected by the resource curse are the ones that react to export booms by ramping 
up government consumption instead of investment.15  
Gylfason (2001b), in a cross section of 162 countries from 1965 to 1998, also shows a 
negative correlation between the share of the labor force in the primary sector and investment 
rates and secondary education.16 Gylfason (2008) shows the importance of distinguishing 
between resource wealth and resource dependence.  In a cross section of 108 countries from 
1960-2000, he shows that school life expectancy is negatively related to resource dependence but 
positively correlated with resource wealth.17 Stijns (2006), in a cross-section of 70 countries 
from 1971 to 1995, however, shows that the correlation between education and natural resources 
also depends on how resources are measured.  More specifically, he shows that mineral exports 
are positively correlated with education levels, while agricultural wealth is negatively correlated 
with education.18 Stijns (2009) builds on these findings in a recent paper, where he shows that 
subsoil wealth is positively and significantly related to a wide array of human capital indicators 
in a cross section of between 69 to 77 countries. Cabrales and Hauk (2011), in a cross-sectional 
study of 59 countries in 2000, find that the relationship between human capital and natural 
resources depends on a country’s institutions. 
                                                
15 Lange (2004) uses the cautionary tale of Namibia to provide support for the argument that the resource curse 
mostly afflicts countries that do not invest sufficiently after export booms. 
16 The education sample is shortened to 1980-1998 and includes 166 countries. 
17 The UN defines school life expectancy as “the total number of years of schooling which a child can expect to 
receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to 
the current enrolment ratio at that age.” (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/Demographic/products/socind/education.htm) 
18 Maloney (2002) and Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio (2006) show how higher levels of human capital can eliminate 
the negative impact that resource wealth can have on economic development. 
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There has been also an increasing body of literature that argues that the resource curse is 
non-existent.  For instance, Lederman and Maloney (2007) refer to it as a “missing resource 
curse.” Several empirical analyses, such as Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s (2008), have found that 
there is no evidence of a resource curse and that the idea of a curse is a “red herring” that tempts 
policymakers into blaming economic problems on resource abundance.19 Furthermore, Boyce 
and Emery (2011) argue that resource abundance can even be a blessing in the long term.20  
 Our paper departs from previous papers in that we investigate the role of resource 
dependence on physical and human capital accumulation in a well-specified simultaneous 
system.  Most of the earlier papers on the topic calculate correlation coefficients between 
measures of natural resources and either investment or education.  We want to study the effect of 
resource dependence on factor accumulation while (1) controlling for other relevant variables 
that could affect human and physical capital, and (2) controlling for the fact that the two types of 
capital are jointly determined.  Furthermore, investigating the impact of natural resource 
dependence on capital accumulation in Latin America is important since human and physical 
capital are key determinants of economic growth. The next section describes our methodology 
and the data used to test our hypotheses. 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) find that while natural resource dependence has no effect on growth, resource 
abundance has a positive effect on growth and institutions. Van der Ploeg and Poelhedke (2010), however, argue 
that natural resource dependence leads to high macroeconomic instability in some countries, which in turn 
diminishes the prospects of growth. When addressing some econometric issues they argue are present in 
Brunscheweiler and Bulte’s (2008) analysis, they find no evidence that resources are either a curse or a blessing. 
Mainguy (2011) also argues that resource abundance has been neither a curse nor a blessing for Mali, a country that 
depends heavily on gold exports. 
20 Boyce and Emery (2011), using data for US states during the period 1970-2001, show that resource abundance is 
negatively correlated with growth but positively correlated with income levels.  
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
We investigate the effect of resource dependence on factor accumulation in a panel of 17 
Latin American countries from 1975 to 2004.21 The sample includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We average the data 
into 5 year intervals when possible, allowing us to capture information from fluctuations over 
time and average cross-country differences.22   
We model human and physical capital in a simultaneous system because Grier (2002) 
finds that the two forms of capital are jointly endogenous in Latin America.  That is, increases in 
the stock of physical capital raise average education levels, while increases in average education 
positively influence the physical capital stock.  To construct the physical capital stock per worker 
variable, we follow the perpetual inventory method of Caselli and Feyrer (2007).23 We measure 
the stock of human capital as the average years of primary schooling in the population aged 15 
and over.  Although secondary schooling is commonly used as a measure of human capital 
(Mankiw et al., 1992), primary schooling may be a better measure of human capital in 
developing countries, where overall levels are lower on average.24  Unlike in wealthy countries, 
where primary school attainment levels near 100%, there is a lot of variation in primary 
                                                
21 It is possible that resource dependence is a result, at least in part, of public policy and not merely natural 
endowments.  For our purposes, however, it does not matter why a country is dependent on natural resources 
(whether it is caused by geography or policy), but rather the effect of export dependence on the accumulation of 
human and physical capital.  
22 Brunnschweiler (2008) notes that the exports of commodities are notoriously volatile and that measuring natural 
resource intensity with a single year of exports may produce misleading results. Using 5-year intervals will help to 
alleviate such problems. 
23 While definitely not perfect, the perpetual inventory is the most commonly used method to calculate the stock of 
physical capital. After constructing our measure of per-worker stocks of physical capital, we rank the countries in 
our sample and the results seem intuitively plausible.  In our initial period, for example, Venezuela and Argentina 
have the highest calculated per worker stocks of physical capital, while Paraguay and Honduras have the lowest.   
24 Sachs and Warner (1999). For instance, Lin (2006) studies Taiwanese growth from 1964 to 2000 and finds that 
primary schooling was the level of education most important for Taiwan’s rapid economic development.  All of the 
countries in our sample are classified as less developed countries by World Bank standards.  As a robustness, test, 
we re-estimated our regressions in the paper using total education and the results were virtually identical. 
 10 
schooling rates in our sample.  Even as late as 2000-04, Argentina and Chile averaged more than 
five years of primary schooling, while Nicaragua, Colombia, and Guatemala averaged less than 
three years.25   
Our principal measure of resource dependence is the total exports of primary 
commodities divided by GDP.26 We use an alternative measure of resource dependence: total 
exports of primary commodities divided by total exports.27 Total exports of primary commodities 
as a share of total exports is a popular indicator of resource dependence in the literature and it is 
valuable to test whether our results hold when using this alternative measure.28 
Estimating any simultaneous system is challenging, but it is especially difficult in a 
model where the two dependent variables both represent forms of capital. Identification of the 
system requires that we find variables that are correlated with the accumulation of one type of 
capital but not the accumulation of the other. In the physical capital equation, we include 
government spending as a share of GDP, land distribution, trade openness, the standard deviation 
of the inflation rate, the number of coups, and the number of years in which a country 
experienced a civil war in the previous period.29  All of right hand side variables in both 
equations are lagged one period (i.e. 5 years) to help reduce potential endogeneity problems. 
                                                
25 Indeed, for our sample, the standard deviation of primary education is almost double that for secondary education.  
26 Data on primary commodities is from the UNCOMTRADE, SITC, Revision 1. 
27 Lujala et al. (2005) argue that natural resources as a percentage of GDP may be an endogenous regressor in 
income and growth equations.   Countries that have high levels of political instability and low levels of income 
growth may appear to be more dependent on primary commodities than they really are because the denominator 
(GDP) is falling faster than the numerator.  We believe this problem is most applicable to resource-rich Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  While Latin America has experienced its fair share of political instability, for the most part the 
instability has not been as severe or as prolonged as it has in countries like Angola or the Congo.  In addition, we are 
not studying the effect of resource intensity on income or income growth, which should lessen the problem of 
endogeneity.  Lastly, we use alternative measures, such as per-worker terms and share of total exports, which should 
not suffer from the same endogeneity issue.  
28 We also explore as an alternative indicator of resource dependence total primary commodities per worker in the 
robustness section. More discussion of this alternative indicator is provided in the robustness section. 
29 Unlike Grier (2002), we measure inequality in terms of resources instead of income.  Specifically, we follow 
Easterly (2007) and use the percentage of the total area of land holdings held as family farms. The advantage of 
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To help identify this equation, we assume that the lag of trade openness, the standard 
deviation of inflation, coups, and civil war directly affect the accumulation of physical capital, 
but not human capital.  There are several theoretical and empirical reasons to support these 
assumptions.  First, several papers test for an empirical relationship between education levels and 
trade openness and do not find strong support for the idea that the two are statistically related.30  
Second, the theoretical literature on economic and political instability has not established a clear 
link between education rates and instability, and the empirical literature has focused almost 
entirely on the effect of instability on investment or income growth.31 
In the human capital equation, we include the level and square of the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index, the lag of the number of years in which the country was considered a 
democracy, the lag of government spending as a share of GDP, and the lag of land distribution.  
Ethno-linguistic diversity is entered in the model non-linearly because previous research casts 
doubt on the idea that diversity has a monotonic effect on education levels. High levels of 
diversity may mean that it is impossible for any particular group to impose their decisions on 
others. Because of the disagreement on educational policy in a diverse society, we expect to find 
a negative correlation between human capital and diversity (Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and 
Levine, 1997). 
For over identification purposes, we assume that democracy and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization directly affect the stock of human, but not physical, capital.  The literature has 
not focused on the relationship between physical capital and democracy, per se, but it has 
                                                                                                                                                       
using this indicator as a proxy for inequality is that it is consistently available over time for the countries included in 
the sample.   
30 Sachs and Warner (1995) and Harrison (1996). It is possible that the trade openness variable is highly correlated 
with the natural resource exports variable, thus giving misleading results about the impact of natural resources on 
capital accumulation.  However, in our sample, trade openness and natural resource exports are not significantly 
correlated (the correlation coefficient is only 0.11) and we use the lag of trade openness in the physical capital 
equation. 
31 See, for example, Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998). 
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explored the relationship between democracy and income.  Much of the empirical literature has 
failed to find a robust positive link between democracy and income growth.  Acemoglu et al. 
(2008) show in a large sample of countries from 1960 to 2000 that any significant relationship 
between democracy and per-capita income disappears once fixed effects are included in the 
model specification.32   
The theoretical and empirical links between education and democracy seems to be 
stronger. Barro (1996) argues that democracy brings about lower fertility rates, which in turn 
leads to increasing education among women. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) find that democracy 
is associated with more spending on education, a result supported recently by Gallego (2010).33   
Gallego (2010) notes that there are several ways in which democracy may promote the 
accumulation of human capital.  First, democracies may be better at “overcoming such market 
failures as credit constraints in financing education.” (Gallego, 2010; p. 229) Second, higher 
levels of suffrage tend to be associated with higher levels of spending on education.  He tests this 
theory in a sample of more than 50 ex-colonies and finds a positive and significant relationship 
between democracy and primary education.34 
 Like democracy, the effect of ethno-linguistic diversity on education seems clearer than 
its effect on physical capital.  The literature has focused on diversity and income growth rather 
                                                
32 See Brunetti (1997) for a good survey of this literature.   
33  On the other hand, Mulligan et al. (2004) find no evidence that educational spending is significantly different 
between democracies and dictatorships in a sample of 142 countries from 1960 to 1990. Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
show in a sample of 108 countries from 1965 to 2000 that changes in average education levels are not significantly 
related to changes in democracy.  More recently, however, Bobba et al. (2007) argue that these results are due to the 
fact that Acemoglu et al. use a weak instrument in their estimation.  When they correct for this, they find that 
education and democracy are significantly related. 
34 In an interesting historical comparison, Lindert (2002) studies democracy and education in India and Sri Lanka.  
British colonial authorities awarded Sri Lanka with universal suffrage in 1931, while only giving Indians very 
narrow suffrage rights in 1919.  Lindert notes that enrollment in primary schooling was greater than 50% in Sri 
Lanka during the period 1935-40, while it still had not reached even 15% in India.  
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than investment per se and the results are decidedly mixed.35  As we are already controlling for 
the uncertainty that arises from economic and political instability in the physical capital equation, 
we believe that ethno-linguistic fractionalization should only directly impact education. 
In sum, our identifying assumptions are that trade openness, inflation variability, and 
political instability directly affect physical capital and not human capital, while democracy and 
ethno-linguistic diversity directly affects human, but not physical, capital. As a preliminary test 
of these assumptions, we estimated our system including one control variable at a time in the 
equation in which we assume it should be excluded. We find that these excluded variables are 
not statistically significant at any conventional level. Thus, as an initial pass, our identifying 
assumptions seem appropriate.36 Table 2 provides a detailed explanation of all the variables used 
in the analysis and their sources, and Table 3 provides summary statistics. 
We estimate the system of equations with a General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator, which accounts for the contemporaneous correlation of the error terms in the two 
equations and uses a weighting matrix that is robust to heteroskedasticity.37 As mentioned above, 
identification of the system requires that we find variables that affect human capital but not 
physical capital (and vice versa).  In our case, the number of independent variables that are 
unique (that is, appear in one equation but not the other) is greater than the number of equations 
in the system. This means that our system is over identified.  GMM minimizes a criterion 
function that is itself a function of the correlation between the instruments and errors terms, 
                                                
35 See, for example, Lian and Oneal (1997) and Nettle (2000). 
36 We find that when we included the excluded variables into each equation, one at the time, they are not statistically 
significant and our previous results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. These estimations are not included 
for purpose of space, but are available upon request. 
37 See Wooldridge (2002) for more on system GMM estimation. The weighting matrix used in our estimation is a 
White covariance matrix, which is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. We use simultaneous updating, 
which continuously updates the coefficients and weighting matrix, iterating until the coefficients and weighting 
matrix converge. We also estimated the system using 3SLS and the results were virtually identical.  The system 
methods are preferred over 2SLS because there is significant correlation between the error terms in our models.        
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which allows us to test the null hypothesis that these over identifying restrictions are valid.38  
The minimum value of the GMM criterion function multiplied by the sample size is distributed 
as a χ2 with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of over identifying restrictions in the 
model.39  We calculate and report this statistic for all of our estimations below. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
A. The Effect of Natural Resource Dependency on Human and Physical Capital 
 System 1 of Table 4 presents the results of our model using total exports of natural 
resources as a fraction of GDP as our measure of resource dependence.  The calculated J-test 
statistic (reported below the results) indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our 
identifying restrictions are valid at even the 0.50 level.40   
We find that that physical and human capital are jointly endogenenous, where an increase 
in the stock of one type of capital has a positive and significant effect on the stock of the other.     
In addition, we find that inflation variability, civil war, and trade openness are all negatively 
related to the accumulation of physical capital.  We expected the first two variables to be 
negatively related to physical capital accumulation, and we hypothesized that the coefficient on 
trade openness could theoretically be either positive or negative.  If a country is more open to 
trade, it is also better able to import technology to help make its domestic manufacturing sector 
more competitive and efficient.  However, if a country is exporting primary goods in return for 
imported manufactured goods, it is possible that these imports could deter the development of a 
                                                
38  This test assumes a valid identification and only tests for whether the system is properly overidentified.  
39 The critical value for all systems estimated is 8.12 at the 15 percent level with five degrees of freedom. 
40 The high p-values for all of our estimated models indicate that we are probably not committing Type II error when 
we fail to reject this null.   
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strong manufacturing base.  While we do not know that this is the case in Latin America, the 
negative coefficient is at least consistent with that story. 
Government expenditures are positively related to physical capital at the .05 level.  The 
coefficient on land distribution (our proxy for inequality) is insignificantly different from zero. In 
the human capital equation, ethno-linguistic diversity has a non-linear effect on human capital.  
Both the level and the square of logged diversity levels are negative and significant at the .01 
level.  The effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) is positive up until ELF reaches the 
value .24, after which any further increases reduce the stock of human capital.41  All countries 
but Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru have diversity levels below the 
turning point.  Neither government spending, democracy, nor land distribution has a statistically 
significant effect on the accumulation of human capital.  
Turning to our main variables of interest, we find that natural resource dependence is not 
statistically related to physical capital accumulation. This is consistent with the findings of Sachs 
& Warner (1999), who show that investment and natural resources are not significantly 
correlated with one another.  
We re-estimate the system using an alternative measure of resource dependence: primary 
commodity exports divided by total commodity exports.  System 2 of Table 4 reports the results.  
The sign and significance of the control variables in both systems are similar to those reported in 
Table 4.  We find some evidence of a negative, but statistically weak, relationship between 
natural resource dependence and physical capital.  The net effect of an increase in natural 
resource dependence of one percent would be a drop in physical capital by .14%. 
                                                
41 This finding may seem counter intuitive as the coefficients on ELF and ELF squared are negative.  The reason the 
effect of diversity is positive, however, is due to the fact that we are using the natural logarithm of the data.  Since 
the ELF index ranges between 0 and 1, logging the data results in negative numbers. 
 16 
Given the fact that the natural resource variable is insignificant in System 1, and only 
weakly significant at the 10 percent level in System 2, we conclude that resource dependence 
does not seem to be having a strong dampening effect on factor accumulation in Latin America.42   
However, our measure of resource dependence consists of a wide range of commodities from 
different categories. The impact of natural resource dependence on capital accumulation may be 
dependent on the type of resource in question. For example, the production of minerals requires 
different levels of physical and human capital than the production of agricultural goods. In the 
next section, we explore whether the effect of resource dependence on physical and human 
capital differs depending on the type of commodity that is being exported.  
 
B. The Effect of Different Commodity Types on Capital Accumulation  
 Aggregate measures of resource dependence may mask differences among various 
categories of commodities.  Isham et al. (2005), for example, find that countries which have 
highly localized resources (called point source resources), like minerals and plantation crops, 
grow slower and have worse institutions on average than countries with more widespread, or 
diffuse, natural resources.43  In this section, we disaggregate our resource variable into three 
categories of export dependence:  mineral, petroleum, and agricultural.44  We first discuss the 
reasons why each of these categories may affect the accumulation of capital differently, and then 
re-estimate our system with disaggregated measures of resource dependence.  
                                                
42 The term resource curse usually refers to the effect of natural resources on economic development or growth. 
While we are studying factor accumulation and not income, the two are positively related.  The correlation between 
real per-capita income and our measure of physical capital from 2000-04 is 0.82, indicating that countries in the 
region that have more physical capital per worker also tend to have higher average per-capita incomes.  
43 On the other hand, Mavrotas et al. (2011), in a sample of 56 developing countries from 1970 to 2000, find that 
resource dependence, whether it be of the point source or diffuse variety, has a negative effect on institutions, which 
in turn dampens overall economic growth. 
44 We consider as mineral commodities the commodities from SITC codes 32, 34, 35, and 68. Petroleum is specified 
by the SITC code 33. Agricultural commodities include 1-9, 11, 12, 41-43, and 94 SITC codes.     
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B.1 Mineral Exports 
Mineral resources, such as diamonds and oil, may make countries particularly vulnerable 
to a resource curse, while other commodities, such as pasture land and forests, may actually be 
favourable for development.  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) make this point for the case 
of Nigeria, arguing that sub-soil assets like minerals and petroleum have been bad for growth, 
while agriculture has not.45  The World Bank (2006, p. 27) calculates that Latin America has the 
third highest percentage of its natural resources in mineral form.  Table 1 shows that mineral 
exports made up 20% of total merchandise exports on average in 2000-04.  While many of the 
countries in the sample are large mineral exporters, there is a lot of variation in the sample.  For 
instance, more than 30% of the merchandise exports from Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, 
Peru, and Colombia consist of mineral exports, while less than two percent in Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Honduras, Uruguay, and Costa Rica.46  
 The empirical literature on minerals and growth has produced mixed results, and the 
relationship between mineral export dependence and factor accumulation is similarly unclear.47  
Mining is typically a very capital-intensive process, but one that may not have a lot of forward 
and backward linkages to the rest of the economy.48 It is possible that developing countries that 
rely heavily on mining exports could have widespread poverty combined with high per-capita 
levels of physical capital.  Auty (2001a), however, shows that fast-growing resource-poor 
countries had average gross fixed investment rates greater than 25% of GDP.  He compares that 
                                                
45 On the other hand, Stijns (2005) makes almost the opposite claim, arguing that land abundance may negatively 
affect growth while minerals may have either a positive or negative effect.	  	  	  
46 Chile, for example, has “one of the largest and most-developed mining industries in the world” and is the “world's 
leading supplier of copper, copper ores and concentrates” (WTO, Chile, p. 68).  
47 Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) find in a large cross section of countries any negative effect of minerals on growth 
is caused by the indirect effects that these resources have on corruption, terms of trade, investment, and education. 
Davis (1995) reports a positive link between minerals and growth, while Stijns (2005) finds that the empirical 
relationship is mixed. 
48 Auty (2001, p. 30) writes that “the mining sector usually employs much foreign capital but only a small, albeit 
well-paid workforce, so that final demand linkage (i.e. domestic spending by capital and labor) is modest.”   
 18 
to resource-rich Latin America, where Edwards (1997) found that investment levels averaged 
only 20% of GDP between 1960 and 1980.  Mikesell (1997) argues that there are many mineral 
exporters that “do not save and invest enough to compensate for the depletion of their reserves.”  
As evidence of this, he shows that gross investment as a percentage of GDP fell in the majority 
of the mineral-exporting countries from 1970 to 1993.49  
 With respect to mineral export dependence and the accumulation of human capital, 
Gylfason (2001) and Birdsall et al. (2001) find evidence that the two are negatively related, 
while Davis (1995) and Stijns (2006) report a positive and significant relationship.50  Lagos and 
Blanco (2010), in a study of a region of Chile (Antofagasta) that relies heavily on copper 
production, find that the impact of resource abundance on education is complex. Specifically, 
they show that average overall schooling is higher in this region, but that there are some areas 
where illiteracy rates are very high in comparison to the national average. They also find that the 
quality of education has decreased in this region since 1998, and that it differs across cities.  
One reason the results are so mixed in relation to the impact of minerals on human capital 
accumulation may be that mineral resources should be divided into petroleum and non-petroleum 
categories.51 We explore the possibility in the next section that petroleum exports may have a 
separate effect on factor accumulation. 
B.2 Petroleum Exports 
While petroleum is also a sub-soil resource and is often categorized as such, it may be 
worth disaggregating the data further to test whether petroleum exports have a separate effect on 
factor accumulation.  Some countries in our sample export a lot of oil (either as a share of GDP 
                                                
49 Papyrakisa and Gerlagh (2006) develop a model of overlapping generations to demonstrate why mineral exporting 
countries do not incentive to save and invest as much as they should after an export boom. 
50 Mainardi (1995) develops a theoretical model in which investment in the minerals sector must provide a certain 
level of economic rents for the development of human capital and technology. 
51 In a study that focuses on a major copper production area of Chile, Antofagasta, Lagos and Blanco (2010) study  
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or of total exports), while others export little to nothing.  Venezuela is the top petroleum exporter 
in the region, with oil revenues making up 84% of its total exports and around 21% of its GDP.  
Ecuador and Mexico are the next two largest oil exporters.  Ecuador’s oil exports make up 
almost one-half of all of its exports and 11% of its GDP.  Mexico is more diversified, with oil 
exports making up 29% of total exports but only 3.6% of GDP.  Countries such as Nicaragua, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Honduras, and Paraguay, on the other hand, have oil exports that 
make up less than one percent of their total exports. 
Karl (2007, p. 7) argues that petroleum exports are even more prone to the resource curse 
than other minerals, arguing that, “petroleum may be one of the hardest resources to utilize 
well…[and that]…countries dependent on oil exports seem particularly susceptible to policy 
failure.”  On the other hand, the effect of petroleum exports on capital accumulation is likely to 
be similar to that of minerals in general in the sense that the oil industry is highly capital 
intensive with very few linkages to the rest of the domestic economy.   
Most of the literature on oil and development investigate the relationship between 
petroleum exports and economic growth.  Sachs and Warner (1999) show that countries that are 
dependent on oil exports have slower economic growth on average than other countries.  Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian (2003) find support for this idea in the case of Nigeria. Maloney (2002) 
argues that petroleum exports are not necessarily associated with lower levels of development.  
More recently, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) show that countries rich in oil and minerals have 
higher per-capita GDP levels than ones without such resources.  
   As for oil’s effect on human capital, Karl (2007, p. 11) finds that educational attainment 
and spending on education are both lower on average in oil exporting countries.  She writes that, 
“in the OPEC countries, for example, 57% of all children go to secondary school compared with 
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64% for the world as a whole…[and that]…OPEC spends less than four percent of the GNP on 
education compared with almost five percent for the world as a whole.”   The reason why 
education lags in these countries is not obvious, but Karl (2007) reasons that perhaps 
governments are less concerned with educating the citizenry because they feel they can import 
the skilled personnel to work in the oil sector.   
B.3 Agricultural Exports 
Manufacturing is typically more capital intensive, both in terms of skills and equipment, 
than agricultural production.  So in this sense it would not be surprising to find a negative 
relationship between agricultural export dependence and physical and human capital. This would 
be especially true if countries are experiencing real exchange rate appreciation due to the Dutch 
disease, where the primary good sector is pushing out the more technologically advanced 
manufacturing sector.  It is also possible that large plantation crops, such as sugar or tobacco, 
may be similar to mineral sectors in that they are capital-intensive enclaves with few linkages to 
the rest of the economy.  Auty (2001a) argues that if commercial plantation owners dominate the 
economy, they may see little reason to expand educational opportunities or promote economic 
diversification.  They would be interested in infrastructure development only to the extent that it 
facilitated the exporting of their crops.   
Nicaragua and Honduras rely more on agricultural exports than any other countries in the 
sample, with agricultural goods making up more than 65% of both countries’ natural resource 
exports.  In addition, despite many years of export diversification attempts, total agricultural 
exports for most of the countries in our sample are concentrated in a few products.  For example, 
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five commodities (soybeans, beef, maize, soybean cake, and soybean oil) make up 83% of 
Paraguay’s agricultural exports.52   
Unlike the case of mineral resources, Stijns (2006) finds that agricultural export intensity 
is negatively related to human capital.  Isham et al. (2005) argue that only 2 of the 17 Latin 
American countries in their sample are diffuse resource exporters (Argentina and Honduras).  
The fact that so few of Latin American countries export diffuse commodities may mean that 
agricultural export dependence negatively affects factor accumulation. 
B.4 Results 
We disaggregate our original resource variable into mineral, petroleum, and agricultural 
categories.53 System 1 of Table 5 reports the results of using mineral, petroleum, and agricultural 
exports as a fraction of GDP, while System 2 re-estimates the results using our alternative 
measure of resource intensity (resource exports as a share of total exports).  In both cases, it is 
clear that the disaggregated measures of resource intensity better explain the variability of capital 
accumulation in the region. The R2 of the physical capital equation has increased from .521 to 
.691, while the R2 of the human capital equation increased from .492 to .556. 
The results from both systems also show that the different types of commodities have 
very different effects on factor accumulation.  System 1 of Table 5 demonstrates that mineral 
resource dependence (as a share of GDP) has no statistically significant effect on either human or 
                                                
52 Likewise, the top five agricultural exports of Honduras (coffee, bananas, palm oil, melons, and sugar) make up 77 
percent of its total agricultural exports, while the top five in Bolivia (soybean cake, soybean oil, nuts, sunflower oil, 
and oilseed flower) and Ecuador (bananas, organic materials, cocoa beans, fruit, and sugar confectionery) make up 
74 percent and 76 percent, respectively, of their total agricultural exports. 
53 Note that commodities with the SITC codes 21-29, 63, and 64, which were all included in our aggregate measure 
of resource dependence, are not included in either the mineral or agricultural classification.  These commodities do 
not fit in either category and are better classified as materials.  When we add a materials variable to our model, we 
find that the coefficient is statistically insignificant and that its inclusion does not affect the sign or magnitude of the 
coefficients on the other commodity types.  These results are not included but are available upon request.    
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physical capital accumulation.54  Petroleum export dependence, however, is a different story.  Oil 
exports as a share of GDP is positive and significant in the physical capital equation and negative 
and significant in the human capital equation (both at the one percent level).  Agricultural export 
dependence as a share of GDP is negatively related to physical capital, while insignificantly 
related to human capital accumulation.55 As can be seen in System 2 of Table 5, these results are 
robust to using mineral, oil, and agricultural exports as share of total exports.   
We calculate the direct and equilibrium effects of petroleum and agricultural resource 
dependence on capital accumulation using the coefficients from System 1.  The direct effect of a 
one percent increase in petroleum exports is reflected in an increase in physical capital of 0.05% 
and a decrease in human capital of 0.02%.  An increase of agricultural exports as a share of GDP 
of one percent, however, is associated with a decrease in physical capital of 0.15%. 
Since the two forms of capital are jointly determined, there are spillover effects between 
them and we need to calculate the long-run equilibrium effect of each commodity group on 
capital.  The equilibrium effect of a one percent increase in petroleum exports is an increase in 
physical capital by 0.04%, but a decrease in human capital by .01%. The magnitude of both 
effects is very small, meaning that petroleum export dependence does not have much of an 
overall impact on capital accumulation in Latin America.   
The equilibrium effect of an increase of agricultural exports as a share of GDP by one 
percent is reflected in the long run as a decrease in physical capital by 0.19% and a decrease in 
human capital by 0.04%. From this result, we conclude that the effect of agricultural export 
                                                
54 Our measure of mineral export dependence consists of commodities classified as minerals and metals.  Since the 
natural log cannot be taken of a zero value, we adjusted 4 observations for Paraguay to a number very close to zero 
(we imputed 1E-13 for these observations). 
55 The signs and significance of the control variables are similar to those reported in Tables 4, except that land 
distribution is now negative and significant in the physical capital equation at the 5% level.  Thus, countries that 
have more agricultural land held as family farms (representing higher equality) also tend to have lower levels of 
overall physical capital.     
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dependence on capital accumulation is negative on physical capital and close to zero on human 
capital.   
In sum, our results demonstrate that not all resources affect factor accumulation in the 
same way and that studies of the impact of resource dependence on development should 
disaggregate resources into categories. Specifically, we find that petroleum and agricultural 
exports have a statistically significant effect on capital accumulation.  While the equilibrium 
effect of petroleum dependence on physical capital is mostly positive, the effect of agricultural 
export intensity is negative. In addition, both have a very small negative effect on the 
accumulation of human capital.  The magnitude of all of these effects are relatively small, 
leading us to conclude that there does not seem to be strong evidence of a resource curse in the 
region, at least in terms of factor accumulation.  In the next section, we test the robustness of our 
results by using alternative indicators for human capital and natural resource dependence and 
controlling for several institutional variables. 
C. Robustness  
In this section, we explore whether our results are robust to several different scenarios. 
First, we estimate our model using alternative indicators for human capital and natural resource 
dependence.  While the average years of primary schooling is commonly used as an indicator of 
human capital in developing countries, we test whether our results are robust to using a more 
general indicator of education that takes into consideration all levels of education. We do so by 
estimating our model using the average years of schooling of the population. We also re-estimate 
the model using an alternative measure of resource dependence: per-worker resource exports. 
Lederman and Maloney (2009) argue that commodity exports in per-worker terms are a better 
alternative to the common practice of measuring resource dependence as a percentage of GDP.   
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They claim that such measures overstate true resource abundance, are endogenous in growth 
equations, and that per worker measures are a better proxy of relative endowments across 
countries.56 While we are not estimating the effect of natural resource dependence on growth, 
capital accumulation is closely related to GDP, and it is worthwhile to test whether our results 
are robust to their proposed indicator.57 Second, we discuss in more detail the potential 
relationship between natural resources and institutions, and test whether our results are robust to 
the inclusion of variables that account for alternative institutional structures. Specifically, we 
include measures of civil liberties and control of corruption. 
C1. Alternative Indicators for Human Capital and Natural Resource Dependence 
Table 6 presents the results of using total average years of schooling as our measure of 
human capital (System 1) and commodity exports per worker as a proxy for natural resource 
dependence (System 2).58 For the most part, our previous results are robust to using these 
alternative indicators.  Human and physical capital are jointly endogenous and statistically 
significant in System 1. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients for the agricultural, 
petroleum and mineral exports are similar to the results of Table 5.     
In System 2, we find that petroleum exports continue to have a significant positive effect 
on physical capital and a significant negative effect on human capital. In this estimation, the size 
of the coefficients for petroleum exports in both equations is very similar to the one shown in the 
baseline model (System 1 of Table 5). The effect of agricultural exports has changed slightly.  
                                                
56 Lederman and Maloney (2007) re-estimate Sachs and Warner (1999) using net exports of resources per worker 
and show that the negative relationship between resource abundance and growth no longer holds. 
57 Lederman and Maloney (2008) argue that using total exports overstates resource abundance in countries with 
export processing zones where commodities are re-exported. While this may be true for countries like Singapore, we 
find no evidence that re-export zones of commodities are an important factor in our sample. Data from the 
UNCOMTRADE shows that only 5 countries re-exported commodities during the period of analysis, but this re-
exporting was scattered over time and not significant in magnitude when compared with total exports. 
58 In System 2 we use all the variables specified in our baseline model, where the only difference is on the indicators 
of natural resource dependence.  
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We now find no evidence that agricultural export dependence negatively affects physical capital, 
and has a positive, but statistically weak, effect on human capital. 
From these robustness checks, where we use alternative indicators of human capital and 
natural resource dependence, we can conclude that the petroleum exports shows a robust positive 
(negative) effect on physical (human) capital, but the effect on capital accumulation is very 
small. For agricultural exports we can conclude there is no evidence of a robust negative effect 
on capital accumulation, since in System 2, the only significant effect it has on capital 
accumulation is a positive (but weak) one on human capital. 
C2. Institutions and Resource Dependence 
The literature on the resource curse has increasingly emphasized the important role of 
institutions in determining whether resource abundance positively or negatively affects economic 
growth.  One strand of the literature argues that natural resource abundance has a negative effect 
on institutions.  For instance, resource abundance may lead to worse government performance 
and corruption, especially in countries that have point resources such as minerals (Bulte et al., 
2005; Isham et al., 2004; Vicente, 2010). Further, resource abundance can lead to weaker 
democratic institutions because resource rents promote less political turnover, and in some cases, 
more authoritarian regimes (Cabrales and Hauk, 2011).59  
A second strand of the literature argues that the impact of natural resources on economic 
growth is dependent on the type of institutions.  According to Mehlum et al. (2006), whether a 
country has grabber friendly or producer friendly institutions determines a country’s ability to 
                                                
59  See also Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), Boschini et al. (2003), Brollo et al. (2010), Bulte et al. (2005), Collier 
and Hoeffler (2010), Isham et al. (2005), Norman (2009), Ross (2001), Baland and Francois (2000), Tornell and 
Lane (1999), Torvik (2002), and Vicente (2010). 
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reap benefits from the natural resource sector in terms of higher aggregate income.60 If 
institutions are grabber friendly and there is significant rent-seeking, then natural resource 
abundance will reduce income because it drains resources away from other productive activities. 
Robinson et al. (2006) also develop a theoretical model where they show that countries with 
more government accountability and competence are more likely to benefit from a boom in the 
natural resource sector.61  
We have been less concerned about the role of institutions in this paper because our main 
purpose was to determine whether Latin American countries did in fact suffer from a resource 
curse, in the sense that they had lower capital accumulation as a result of their dependence on 
natural resources.  We find no evidence of an overall curse in Latin America, in that primary 
commodity export dependence is not significantly related to either human or physical capital 
accumulation.  However, there is some evidence that agricultural export dependence negatively 
affects the stock of physical capital, while oil exports negatively affects human capital. In this 
section, we test whether these relationships remain significant once we control for institutional 
factors. 
We already have one institutional variable in our system of equations—democratic rule—
but in this section we add several additional measures of institutional quality. Table 7 presents 
the results of including civil liberties and control of corruption into our baseline model. 62  We 
                                                
60 The authors define “grabber-friendly” states as ones where “rent-seeking and production are competing activities” 
(p. 3). 
61 Several empirical analyses have shown that good institutions, such as openness, democratic institutions, and 
government checks and balances, allow natural resource abundant countries to achieve higher economic growth.  
See, for example, Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), Arezki and van der Ploeg (2010), Boschini et al., (2007), Cabrales 
and Hauk (2011), Collier and Hoeffler (2009), and Kolstad (2009). On the other hand, Brunnschweiler (2008) and 
Yang and Lam (2008) find that institutions are not relevant for determining the impact of natural resource on 
economic growth. 
62 We take the natural log of these variables and also lag them to deal for endogeneity. We also estimate the model 
including the constraints on the executive in the system, but found that this indicator had no significant effect on 
either equation. We omit these results for purpose of space, but they are available upon request. 
 27 
find that our previous results are robust to the inclusion of these institutional variables.  In Table 
7, System 1 reports the results of including an indicator of civil liberties and System 2 reports the 
results of including a measure of the control of corruption. We find that civil liberties have a 
positive and significant effect on human capital, while the control of corruption variable has a 
positive and significant effect on physical capital. The sign, significance level, and magnitude of 
the coefficients for petroleum and agricultural variables remain virtually unchanged from the 
results shown in Table 5. Thus, we can conclude that there is evidence of a small direct effect of 
petroleum and agricultural export dependence on capital accumulation even when we control for 
several institutional measures common in the literature. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 We find novel results about the impact of natural resource wealth on factor accumulation 
in a sample of Latin American countries.  Using as our measure of resource dependence total 
commodity exports as a % of GDP, we find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between dependence and capital.63  In addition, we demonstrate that not all resources affect 
capital in the same way.  We find that it is petroleum, and not mineral, exports that have a 
significant effect on capital accumulation. This is an important distinction since several of the 
countries in the region are large petroleum exporters. Further, we find that the effect of 
agricultural dependence on capital accumulation is very different than the effect of petroleum 
dependence.   
While the effect of agricultural exports on capital accumulation is not always robust, we 
find some evidence that countries that rely heavily on agricultural exports have less physical 
                                                
63 When we measure dependence as total primary exports divided by overall commodity exports, we find a negative, 
but statistically weak (and quantitatively small) effect of dependence on physical capital. 
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capital accumulation than other countries. We believe that this finding deserves further research.  
The effect of agricultural production on capital might be partly determined by the degree of land 
concentration, where the impact of plantation agriculture on capital accumulation may differ 
from the effect of smallholder agriculture. The type of technology used in agricultural production 
and the geographic characteristics of the land might also explain the impact of agricultural 
dependence on capital accumulation.     
In addition, while our results illuminate the relationship between natural resources and 
capital accumulation for the Latin American area, further work could extend these results by 
investigating the relationship in other regions.  The results here may not be easily generalized, as 
the effect of natural resources on economic development is likely to vary across regions. 
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TABLE 1 
Commodity exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports (2000-2004 average) 
          
      
 Mineral Agriculture Material Total Commodity  
 Exports Exports Exports Exports  
      
Ecuador 45 38 7 91  
Nicaragua 2 77 10 89  
Venezuela 86 1 1 89  
Paraguay 0 35 52 86  
Chile 30 26 30 85  
Bolivia 31 27 22 81  
Honduras 1 65 14 81  
Peru 30 28 21 79  
Colombia 39 18 8 65  
Guatemala 8 51 7 65  
Uruguay 2 47 16 65  
Dominican Rep. 16 41 4 61  
El Salvador 7 35 10 52  
Brazil 7 22 19 47  
Costa Rica 1 31 5 38  
Mexico 11 5 2 18  
      
Regional Average 20 35 14 68  
      
Source: Authors’ construction using UNCOMTRADE dataset. Mineral 
commodities include the commodities from SITC codes 32-35, and 68. 
Agricultural commodities include 1-9, 11, 12, 41-43, and 94 SITC codes. The 
materials category include commodities with the SITC codes 21-29, 63, and 64  
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TABLE 2  
Variable Description and Sources 
    
Variable Description 
 
Physical capital 
stock 
 
The initial stock of capital is estimated as I0/(g+δ), where I0 is the level of 
investment in the earliest year available (1950 or 1951), g is the average 
geometric growth rate of the level of investment between the first year 
available and 1970, and δ is the depreciation rate equal to 6%. The level of 
investment in a specific year (It) is calculated as the product of the real 
GDP per capita (Laspeyres constant prices), population, and investment 
share. Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the PWT (2006). 
 
Human capital 
stock 
The average years of primary schooling of the population aged 15 and 
over. Data available in 5-year frequency. Source: Barro and Lee (2001). 
 
Natural resources 
GDP share  
Total exports of primary commodities divided by GDP (in current USD), 
where primary commodities include those with SITC codes 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
63, 64, 68, and 94. Source: Authors’ calculation using data from UN 
COMTRADE and WDI. 
 
Natural resources 
export share 
Total exports of primary commodities divided by total commodity exports. 
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from UN COMTRADE. 
 
Natural resources 
per worker 
Total exports of primary goods divided by the labor force. Source: 
Authors’ calculation using data from UN COMTRADE and WDI. 
 
Land distribution  The share of land holdings considered family farms. Data is available in 
10-year frequency (1978, 1988, etc) and is averaged to have two 5-year 
observations every decade. Source: Vanhanen (2003).  
 
 
Government share 
 
 
Government share of real GDP per capita. Source: PWT (2006). 
 
Trade openness Exports plus imports as a share of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres constant 
prices). Source: PWT (Heston et al., 2006). 
 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 
The probability in 1960 that two randomly selected people from a given 
country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. Source: 
Easterly and Levine (1997). 
 
Democracy  Number of years in a 5-year period a country was considered a democracy 
(democracy score > 7). Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2007). 
 
Constraints on the 
executive 
5-year average of the indicator of constraints on the executive. Source: 
Marshall and Jaggers (2007). 
 
Civil liberties 5-year average of the indicator of civil liberties. Source: Skaaning (2006). 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
Period average of the corruption index, using observations from 1984 
through 2004. Source: Political Risk Service Group (2007).  
 
5-year averages are constructed for 1970-74, 1975-79, etc. unless otherwise noted. Linear interpolation 
used to calculate the Dominican Republic’s total exports in the 1990s due to data unavailability.  
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TABLE 3. Summary Statistics, 1975-2004 (5 year average periods) 
	  
   Mean  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
Physical capital stock t 32057.650 85727.730 8780.554 19306.940 
Human capital stock (primary)t 3.715 6.128 1.586 0.936 
Human capital stock (total) t 5.165 8.830 1.910 1.471 
Natural resources exports/GDP t-1 0.129 0.275 0.025 0.065 
Natural resources exports/total exports t-1 0.787 0.985 0.143 0.170 
Natural resources exports/labor force t-1 344.184 1802.170 46.177 314.402 
Agricultural exports/GDP t-1 0.068 0.208 0.001 0.053 
Mineral exports/GDP t-1 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.027 
Oil exports/GDP t-1 0.024 0.233 0.000 0.055 
Agricultural exports/total exports t-1 0.423 0.853 0.006 0.236 
Mineral exports/total exports t-1t 0.079 0.723 0.000 0.157 
Oil exports/total exports t-1 0.118 0.939 0.000 0.230 
Agricultural exports/labor force t-1t 155.526 837.733 6.026 142.333 
Mineral exports/labor force t-1 33.347 495.720 0.000 76.830 
Oil exports/labor force t-1 96.579 1727.824 0.000 280.275 
Government share t-1 19.404 48.863 10.766 6.561 
Land distribution t-1 24.490 54.000 5.000 10.841 
Trade openness t-1 40.763 121.112 7.245 22.863 
Std dev of inflation t-1 241.777 6008.391 0.940 911.626 
Coups t-1 0.206 2.000 0.000 0.514 
Civil war t-1 0.333 5.000 0.000 1.075 
Democracy t-1 1.902 5.000 0.000 2.241 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 0.258 0.680 0.040 0.211 
Constraints on the executive t-1 4.409 7.000 1.000 2.075 
Civil liberties 15.839 19.440 13.850 1.281 
Corruption 2.926 4.641 1.325 0.749 
All variables have 102 observations.  
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TABLE 4. The Effect of Natural Resource Export Intensity on Human and Physical Capital 
 
        System 1  System 2  
Variable 
Physical  
Capital   Human Capital   
Physical 
Capital   Human Capital   
     
Constant 9.300 -1.129 7.775 -1.229 
 (1.040) (0.597) (0.718) (0.644) 
ln(Human capital) 1.819 ***  2.223 ***  
 (0.371)  (0.413)  
ln(Physical capital)  0.229 ***  0.243 *** 
  (0.053)  (0.055) 
ln(Natural resources) t-1 0.162  -0.002  -0.221 * 0.070  
 (0.119) (0.036) (0.133) (0.053) 
ln(Government share) t-1 0.345 ** -0.037  0.358 * -0.051  
 (0.157) (0.072) (0.186) (0.067) 
ln(Land distribution) t-1 -0.047  -0.018  -0.085  -0.004  
 (0.100) (0.040) (0.118) (0.047) 
ln(Trade openness) t-1 -0.518 ***  -0.305 ***  
 (0.140)  (0.116)  
Std. dev. inflation t-1 -0.0001 **  -0.0001 *  
 (0.00003)  (0.00003)  
Coups t-1 -0.059   -0.041   
 (0.047)  (0.038)  
Civil wart-1 -0.091 ***  -0.073 ***  
 (0.027)  (0.029)  
Democracy t-1  0.009   0.009  
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)  -0.214 ***  -0.171 ** 
  (0.082)  (0.087) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)2  -0.071 ***  -0.056 ** 
  (0.026)  (0.029) 
     
J-test (p-value) 2.81(0.72)  2.36(0.80)  
R2 0.521  0.492  0.429  0.492  
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 
the one, five, and ten percent level. Time dummies were estimated but not reported for reasons of space. 
System 1 uses the total exports of primary commodities divided by GDP, while System 2 uses the total 
exports of primary commodities divided by total commodity exports. Both estimations have 102 
observations. 
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TABLE 5. Effect of Mineral, Petroleum, and Agricultural Exports on Human and Physical Capital 
 
 System 1  System 2 	  
Variable 
Physical 
Capital   
Human 
Capital  	  	  
Physical 
Capital  	  	  
Human 
Capital  	  	  
Constant 8.705 -1.636 8.834 -1.645 
	   (0.718) (0.653) (0.550) (0.602) 
ln(Human capital) 1.276 ***  1.286 ***  
	   (0.218)  (0.206)  
ln(Physical capital)  0.256 ***  0.267 *** 
	    (0.064)  (0.052) 
ln(Agricultural exports) t-1 -0.151 *** 0.014  -0.188 *** 0.026  
	   (0.052) (0.026) (0.048) (0.022) 
ln(Mineral exports) t-1 -0.004  -0.001  -0.006  -0.001  
	   (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
ln(Petroleum exports) t-1 0.050 *** -0.020 *** 0.042 *** -0.018 *** 
	   (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
ln(Government share) t-1 0.422 *** -0.018  0.452 *** -0.033  
 (0.123) (0.075) (0.122) (0.071) 
ln(Land distribution) t-1 -0.060  0.004  -0.023  -0.002  
 (0.082) (0.038) (0.079) (0.036) 
ln(Trade openness) t-1 -0.340 ***  -0.400 ***  
	   (0.053)  (0.049)  
Std. dev. inflation t-1 0.0001 ***  -0.0001 ***  
	   (0.00003)  (0.00003)  
Coups t-1 -0.077   -0.066   
	   (0.072)  (0.071)  
Civil war t-1 -0.080 ***  -0.078 ***  
	   (0.025)  (0.022)  
Democracy t-1  0.016 **  0.013 ** 
	    (0.006)  (0.006) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)  -0.233 ***  -0.226 *** 
  (0.079)  (0.074) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)2  -0.082 ***  -0.080 *** 
	    (0.023)  (0.022) 
J-test (p-value) 5.61(0.35)   4.42(0.49)  
R2 0.691  0.556  0.683  0.550  
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the one, 
five, and ten percent level. Time dummies were estimated but not reported for reasons of space. Systems 1 and 2 
use commodity exports as a percentage of GDP and of total exports, respectively. Both estimations have 102 obs. 
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TABLE 6. Alternative indicators for Human Capital and Natural Resource Dependence 
 
 System 1  System 2  
Variable 
Physical 
Capital   
Human 
Capital   
Physical 
Capital   
Human 
Capital   
Constant 7.782 -2.140 9.549 -1.758 
 (0.711) (0.749) (0.586) (0.688) 
ln(Human capital) 1.431 ***  1.436 ***  
 (0.247)  (0.232)  
ln(Physical capital)  0.354 ***  0.274 *** 
  (0.072)  (0.053) 
ln(Agricultural exports) t-1 -0.166 *** 0.038  -0.050  0.039 * 
	   (0.051) (0.030) (0.059) (0.024) 
ln(Mineral exports) t-1 0.001  -0.002  0.002  -0.001  
	   (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
ln(Petroleum exports) t-1 0.042 *** -0.018 *** 0.048 *** -0.014 *** 
	   (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) 
ln(Government share) t-1 0.363 *** -0.041  0.305 ** -0.034  
 (0.135) (0.080) (0.126) (0.074) 
ln(Land distribution) t-1 -0.0002  -0.017  -0.147  -0.018  
 (0.078) (0.042) (0.104) (0.046) 
ln(Trade openness) t-1 -0.249 ***  -0.375 ***  
 (0.064)  (0.060)  
Std. dev. inflation t-1 -0.0001 **  0.0001 ***  
 (0.00003)  (0.00003)  
Coups t-1 -0.029   -0.079   
 (0.054)  (0.050)  
Civil war t-1 -0.054 **  -0.088 ***  
 (0.023)  (0.021)  
Democracy t-1  0.014 **  0.011 * 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)  -0.153 *  -0.221 *** 
  (0.085)  (0.074) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)2  -0.053 **  -0.076 *** 
   (0.026)  (0.022)  
J-test (p-value) 5.60(0.35)   5.56(0.35)   
R2 0.666  0.573  0.675  0.534  
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the one, 
five, and ten percent level. Time dummies were estimated but not reported for reasons of space. Differences in 
systems from baseline model: Systems 1 uses average years of schooling for human capital and System 2 uses 
commodity exports per worker. Both estimations have 102 obs. 
 
 
 42 
TABLE 7. Other Indicators for Institutions 
   
 System 1  System 2  
Variable 
Physical 
Capital   
Human 
Capital   
Physical 
Capital   
Human 
Capital   
Constant 8.096 -2.826 7.702 -1.908 
 (1.344) (0.800) (0.714) (0.749) 
ln(Human capital) 1.172 ***  1.623 ***  
 (0.176)  (0.231)  
ln(Physical capital)  0.272 ***  0.298 *** 
  (0.063)  (0.080) 
ln(Agricultural exports) t-1 -0.175 *** 0.028  -0.192 *** 0.035  
 (0.048) (0.026) (0.047) (0.032) 
ln(Mineral exports) t-1 -0.006  0.0003   -0.010  0.002  
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
ln(Petroleum exports) t-1 0.052 *** -0.021 *** 0.044 *** -0.020 *** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) 
ln(Government share) t-1 0.437 *** -0.063  0.170  0.002  
 (0.110) (0.074) (0.138) (0.078) 
ln(Land distribution) t-1 -0.054  -0.039  -0.077  0.012  
 (0.077) (0.040) (0.068) (0.036) 
ln(Trade openness) t-1 -0.330 ***  -0.180 ***  
 (0.052)  (0.071)  
Std. dev. inflation t-1 -0.0001 **  -0.0001 **  
 (0.00003)  (0.00003)  
Coups t-1 -0.079   -0.058   
 (0.071)  (0.048)  
Civil war t-1 -0.071 ***  -0.073 ***  
 (0.025)  (0.024)  
Democracy t-1  0.007   0.008 * 
  (0.007)  (0.005) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)  -0.233 ***  -0.188 ** 
  (0.079)  (0.090) 
ln(Ethno-ling. frac.)2  -0.088 ***  -0.067 ** 
   (0.023)   (0.029) 
Institutions 0.207  0.487 ** 0.586 *** -0.116  
 (0.413) (0.246) (0.175) (0.135) 
J-test (p-value) 5.56(0.35)   4.69(0.45)   
R2 0.695  0.563  0.715  0.567  
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the one, 
five, and ten percent level. Time dummies were estimated but not reported for reasons of space. Differences in 
systems from baseline model: Systems 1 includes civil liberties and System 2 includes control of corruption. Both 
estimations have 102 obs. 
 
 
